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Financial contracting plays an important role in aligning incentives and mitigating agency 
conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs, thus allowing new ventures to obtain financing.
1
Studies of U.S. venture capital (VC) investing, such as Sahlman (1990) and Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003 and 2004), show that investor contracts carefully allocate cash flow rights, 
liquidation rights, and control rights between the entrepreneur and the VC investor in order to 
mitigate agency conflicts.  Kaplan and Stromberg (2003 and 2004) also show that the 
characteristics of U.S. VC contracts correspond well to the optimal contracts derived by financial 
contracting theories such as Aghion and Bolton (1992), Dessein (forthcoming), and Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1994). 
At the same time, the large and growing literature in law and finance finds that legal and 
institutional differences among countries appear to be important for the development and nature 
of financial markets, and also for economic growth.
2   The ability to design investments and 
financial contracts is potentially dependent on various elements of the institutional environment 
– the nature of corporate and contract law, the quality of legal enforcement, accounting systems, 
tax regulations, financial markets, etc.   If the institutional environment affects the types of 
contracts that can be written, this could change the types of contracts that are optimal.   
This raises the question of whether the financial contracts observed in the U.S. are 
optimal in other institutional environments.  Theories of financial contracting would suggest yes 
(because they assume property rights are enforced and little else).  Alternatively, sufficiently 
great institutional differences might lead to a negative answer.  In this paper, we address this 
1 See Hart (2001). 
2 See King and Levine (1993), Laporta et al. (1997, 1998, and 2000), and Rajan and Zingales (2003). 2
question by studying VC investments across different institutional environments – 145 
investments in 107 companies in 23 countries by 70 different lead VCs.
  First, we describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other 
control rights.  In univariate analyses, the contracts differ significantly across legal regimes.  
While convertible preferred is the most commonly used security, it is used much less frequently 
outside the U.S.; at the same time, ordinary common stock is used more frequently.  Partly as a 
result, VCs investing outside the U.S. deals have weaker control, liquidation and exit rights.
Non-U.S. investments also are less likely to use contingencies – including milestones, vesting 
provisions and anti-dilution rights – resulting in less high-powered cash flow incentives 
compared to their US counterparts.  
  Next, we consider how the contracts vary across legal regimes.  We find that the 
contracts vary systematically across those regimes.  In particular, investments in common law 
countries are more likely to look like U.S. contracts while investments elsewhere are likely to 
differ.  Liquidation preferences, anti-dilution protections, vesting provisions and redemption 
rights are more typical in common law countries while milestones are less common.   These 
results are similar to those found in Lerner and Schoar (2003) who study private equity 
investments in developing countries.
In this part of the analysis, we also consider how well specific measures of the legal and 
institutional environment (such as creditor protection, efficiency of the legal system, tax 
treatment, etc.) explain the differences across legal regimes.  The specific measures are not 
consistently related to the contractual differences (in contrast to the legal regime variables).   
Given the mixed results for institutional factors, we then consider the importance of 
individual VC characteristics and experience.  In examining the contracts, we find that some VC 
firms implement U.S. contractual features across all the countries and institutional environments 3
in which they invest.  In univariate analyses, we find that larger VCs, more experienced VCs, 
and VCs with more exposure to U.S. are significantly more likely to implement U.S. style 
contractual terms.  The results indicate that while it may not be easy or obvious how to adapt 
contracts, with enough effort (or legal fees), VCs can learn to replicate most U.S.-style contracts.   
The results so far lead us to compare the relative important of legal regime and VC 
experience.  We estimate the determinants of contracts using regressions that include both legal 
regime variables and measures of VC experience or sophistication.  In the presence of  the VC 
experience variables, legal regime and institutional differences are relatively less important.  In 
fact, the legal regime variables are not significant in most specifications.   
The results on VC sophistication are consistent with the U.S. model and U.S. contracts 
being optimal outside the U.S.  However, the results also are consistent with more sophisticated 
VCs imposing a style with which they are familiar, but is not necessarily optimal.  We explore 
this possibility by studying the survival of the 70 VCs represented as lead investors in our 
sample.  As of August 2003, 59 of the 70 are still active while 11 have not survived.  We then 
separate the VC funds depending on the securities they used when acting as lead investors.  None 
of the 37 funds that exclusively used convertible preferred (and U.S. style contracts) has failed.
In contrast, 34% of the 29 funds that exclusively used common stock (and non-U.S. style 
contracts) have not survived.  Said another way, of the 11 funds that have not survived, all but 
one never used convertible preferred.  The results persist in multivariate analyses where we 
control for other VC and portfolio company characteristics.  The survival results strongly 
indicate that more successful funds use U.S. style contracts.
Overall, our results suggest that U.S. style contracts are optimal across a wide range of 
legal regimes.  This conclusion is in the spirit of Fama and Jensen (1983) who argue that 
contractual features that survive are likely to be efficient.  As noted earlier, the separate 4
allocation of cash flow, control and liquidation rights found in U.S. style contracts is consistent 
with / predicted by standard financial contracting theories.   The fact that we find more variation 
in non-U.S. contracts (than in the U.S. contracts) suggests the presence of fixed costs of learning.
Consistent with this, all of the funds that used both non-U.S. and U.S. style contracts at some 
point, switched from non-U.S. to U.S. style during the sample period.  Based on both survival 
and learning effects, we would predict more convergence in contracts over time.   
Ours is not the first paper to study VC contracts outside of the U.S.
3   Unlike this paper, 
however, most previous studies focus on a single country and do not compare contracts across 
institutional environments.  Also, most of the studies do not analyze the actual contracts, but, 
instead, rely on survey evidence and self-reporting from VC firms.  This is problematic because 
the studies critically depend on the details of the survey design and template.  For example, as 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) demonstrate, securities with different names can implement 
identical allocations of cash flow and control rights (such as convertible preferred vs. senior 
common stock), while securities with the same name can differ substantially in their rights (e.g. 
standard vs. participating preferred stock). 
In contrast to earlier studies, but similar to ours, contemporaneous work by Lerner and 
Schoar (2003) uses actual contracts in private equity investments in developing countries.  We 
view their sample and paper as an interesting complement to ours.  They find similar results in 
that contracts are significantly related to legal origin.  While they do not focus on the 
sophistication and learning effects that we consider, their results on legal origin are robust to 
including a dummy variable for U.S. or U.K. based organization.  There are at least three 
3 See Bascha and Walz (2001) for Germany, Bengtsson and Lindström (2000) and Isaksson et al. (1999) for Sweden, 
Cumming (2000, 2001) for Canada, and Hege, Palomino, and Schwienbacher (2003) for Europe. 5
possible explanations for the different result.  First, legal differences may be more of a constraint 
in developing countries (although we do not find such a result in the few developing country 
investments in our sample).  Second, they study primarily private equity investments in more 
mature businesses rather than VC investments.  It may be more difficult to contract around 
existing contracts and governance mechanisms.  Finally, their sample includes a substantial 
percentage of transactions in which the investors obtain majority control, making separate 
control and liquidation rights less important.  In our conclusion, we discuss how our results 
might be reconciled with those in Lerner and Schoar (2003).
Our paper also complements earlier work on global venture capital activity.  In a cross-
country study, Jeng and Wells (2000) show that factors such as IPO activity, government policies 
toward start-ups, and labor market rigidities help explain differences in aggregate venture capital 
activity between countries.  Similarly, Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2001) argue that country 
differences in the composition of investors who provide funds to VC firms (banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds, private corporations) result in different VC portfolio characteristics 
across countries with respect to stage, geography, and industry focus.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we discuss the sample.  In section 3, we 
present our univariate analyses of the sample contracts and consider the (univariate) relation of 
those contracts to legal and institutional factors, as well as VC characteristics.  In section 4, we 
present our multivariate results.  In section 5, we relate the contractual terms to VC survival.  In 
section 6, we conclude. 
2. Sample 
2.1 Description
We analyze 145 investments in 107 companies in 23 countries by 70 different lead VCs.6
We obtained investments from two sources – directly from VCs whom we know who invest 
outside the U.S. and indirectly from a limited partner (institutional investor) who invests in non-
U.S. VC partnerships.  All of the VC partnerships were for profit, non-governmental entities.   
For each company and for each financing round for the company, we asked the VC to 
provide the (1) term sheet; (2) stock and security purchase agreements; (3) company’s business 
plan; and (4) the VC’s internal analysis of the investment.  The amount of information we 
obtained differs across investments and the different VCs who provided info. 
Table 1 presents summary information.  Panel A organizes the observations by country 
and legal origin, and reports the number of financing rounds, number of companies, number of 
VCs, and country institutional characteristics.  Investments from countries with common law, 
French law, German law, and Scandinavian law origins are well-represented.  In addition, we 
have five investments from countries of socialist background.  We also report the number of 
companies that reincorporated from and to the different countries. 
Panel B indicates that the sample is relatively recent; all but eight investment rounds were 
completed after 1997.  In the analysis that follows, we compare the contracts in these 
investments to those in Kaplan and Stromberg (20003) who use a sample of U.S. investments 
that is roughly two years older. 
Panel C presents the industry distribution of the portfolio companies in our sample.  The 
greatest percentage of companies, 58%, is in software and internet.  Just over 10% of the 
companies are in each of hardware, telecommunications, and life sciences.  The sample industry 
distribution is qualitatively similar to that for U.S. VC investments over the same period. 
Panel D provides additional information about the investments.  We have the first VC 
round for 89% of the companies and roughly 2/3 of the investments are early stage, meaning that 
the companies are quite young and have a limited operating history.  Finally, the average 7
investment is between $6 and $7 million with a median of just over $3 million. 
2.2  Sample selection issues 
In this section, we discuss potential selection issues concerning our sample.  Our 
companies and financings are not a random sample in that we obtained the data from VC firms 
with whom we have a direct or indirect relationship.
It is possible that we have a bias toward the better investments of a particular VC.  We 
think this is unlikely because the investments we obtained from the VCs we contacted directly 
included their most recent deals while the investments we obtained with the limited partner’s 
help were not selected by the VCs.  Even if some performance bias exists, we do not think it is 
likely to affect our results because we do not attempt to measure performance of individual 
investments.  Rather, we characterize what contracts look like across different countries.
The more serious potential bias is that we have selected the VC firms.  It is possible that 
the average VC in our sample is different from the average VC in the countries we study.  If this 
is so, then our sample averages may be inaccurate.  However, there is, again, no reason to believe 
that our results on cross-sectional differences across legal regimes and types of VCs are biased. 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the sample is selected and it is difficult to know the 
extent of any bias.  We have discussed the more likely biases and do not believe there are any 
obvious red flags. 
3.  Contract characteristics:  Univariate analyses 
In this section, we present univariate analyses of the sample contracts and consider the 
(univariate) relation of those contracts to legal and institutional factors, as well as VC 
characteristics.8
3.1.  Non-U.S. versus U.S. financings 
The first two columns of table 2 describe the contracts in our sample and compare them 
to the U.S. contracts in Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).   There is much more variation in the 
types of securities used outside the U.S.  Whereas over 95% of the U.S. financings employed 
some type of convertible preferred stock, fewer than 54% of the non-U.S. financings employed 
convertible preferred.  Ordinary common stock is more typical outside the U.S., used in almost 
28% of financings versus fewer than 1% in the U.S.
 4  Financings outside the U.S. also make use 
of senior common stock 14.5% of the time.  Although called common stock, senior common 
stock resembles convertible preferred in that it always has a liquidation preference senior to 
ordinary common. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) show that VC financings separately allocate cash flow 
rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights.  Panels B to E of 
table 2 compare these rights in the non-U.S. sample to those in the U.S. sample. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find that VCs use anti-dilution rights, contingencies or 
milestones, and vesting in order to increase the sensitivity of the founder’s cash flow rights to 
performance, consistent with principal-agent theories.  Panel B compares incentive mechanisms 
that affect founder cash flow rights.  VCs investing outside the U.S. have a smaller fully diluted 
ownership percentage than VCs in the U.S. (36.3% versus 46.7%).  This difference is not driven 
by investment round.  We also find that the incentive mechanisms – anti-dilution rights (56% vs. 
4 Cumming (2001) and Lerner and Schoar (2003) obtain qualitatively similar results, i.e., a lesser use of convertible 
preferred and a greater use of common stock. 9
94%), funding milestones (39% vs. 53%), and founder vesting (37% vs. 44%) – are all less 
typical outside the U.S. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) also show that the allocation of liquidation rights is an 
important feature of U.S. VC contracts.  In the U.S., VC securities are almost always senior 
(97% of financings) to common stock in liquidation, and for an amount equal to or greater than 
the amount invested.  The seniority of the VC claim is a standard prediction of many financial 
contracting theories, such as classical moral hazard theories (Holmstrom (1979)), signaling and 
screening theories (Ross (1977) and Diamond (1991)), as well as the stealing theories of debt 
(Hart and Moore (1998)).  Panel C indicates that VC liquidation preferences are smaller in non-
U.S. financings.  In 34% of the non-U.S. financings, the VC security has a liquidation preference 
less than the amount invested.   It also is less common for non-U.S. financings to have a 
liquidation preference that exceeds the amount invested (48% vs. 68%).    
Panel D compares the VC’s ability to force the liquidation of its investment.  Redemption 
rights give the VCs the ability to put their shares back to the company at some future date.  When 
used, the rights typically provide bargaining power to force a sale.  Redemption rights are 
present in 72% of the U.S. financings and only 34% of the non-U.S. financings.  VCs can obtain 
similar bargaining power by including drag-along rights together with seniority.
5  Drag-along 
rights force founders to sell their shares if the VCs decide to sell the company.   When drag-
along rights and other senior exit mechanisms are combined with redemption rights, we find that 
the VCs can force an exit in almost 64% of the non-U.S. financings. 
Consistent with control theories (Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dessein (forthcoming)), 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) show that U.S. contracts allocate substantial control rights such as 10
board seats and voting rights to the VC.  Panel E shows that VCs in non-U.S. financings are less 
likely to obtain board control of the portfolio company (12% vs. 25%), despite obtaining a 
similar percentage of board seats.  
Overall, then, the first two columns of table 2 suggest that the VC contracts outside the 
U.S. have weaker rights of all types than those in the U.S. 
3.2  Relation to legal origin 
A substantial literature studies how differences in legal origins and institutions affect 
various aspects of financial market activity across countries.
6   Countries with French law origins 
and weaker outside investor protection tend to have smaller and less liquid capital markets, more 
concentrated corporate ownership, lower corporate dividends, and lower valuations.  Some 
papers also have attempted to link such factors specifically to the extent of VC activity.
7
The legal system may affect the design of financial contracts in such a way that certain 
contractual provisions may be infeasible or more costly to enforce.  In addition, the contracts 
may need to incorporate new protective mechanisms to make up for the legal deficiencies.
We now consider how the non-U.S. contracts in our sample vary with the legal origin of the 
country in which the portfolio company is located.  The last five columns of table 2 classify the 
non-U.S. contracts in our sample into one of five different legal regimes – common law, French 
law, German law, Scandinavian law, and socialist background.  Except for socialist background 
with only five contracts, we have at least 26 contracts in the other four legal regimes.  In our 
discussion, we generally will not refer to the results for the socialist background countries 
5 For an analysis of drag-along rights, see Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2003). 
6 See Laporta et al. (1997, 1998, and 2000), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). 11
because of the small number of observations. 
  Table 2 shows that for most provisions, common law country contracts tend to resemble 
U.S.-style contracts more than those in countries with other legal origins.  Common law country 
deals tend to make greater use of convertible preferred and less use of ordinary common stock 
while Scandinavian law country deals tend to do the opposite.  Common law country contracts 
(1) include more anti-dilution protection; (2) make greater use of vesting provisions; (3) are more 
likely to have a liquidation preference at least equal to the amount invested; (4) are more likely 
to have some type of exit mechanism; and (5) are the least likely to keep the founder in control 
of the board.   The one sense in which common law country contracts are less like those in the 
U.S. is that the common law country deals are the least likely to use milestones.  
Overall, these results suggest that legal origins / legal regimes affect the nature and types 
of contracts that are written.  This is consistent with the evidence in the LaPorta et al. papers that 
countries differ in their corporate law and in the ability to write and enforce contracts 
3.3  Relation to legal, tax, and accounting institutions  
  The results in the previous section indicate that legal origins matter for contracts, but do 
not indicate why.  In this section, we consider whether eight specific measures of differences in 
legal rules, tax rules, accounting rules, and market institutions drive those results.
First, we consider the rule of law index used by LaPorta et al. (1997).  The index is a 
measure of the quality of a country’s legal and enforcement system.
8  The first column of table 3 
indicates that U.S. style contracts are negatively correlated with the rule of law measure.  
7 See Black and Gilson (1998), Jeng and Wells (2000), and Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2001) 12
Convertible preferred, anti-dilution rights, liquidation preferences, and exit provisions are more 
common in countries with low rule of law.  One might interpret this result as showing that U.S. 
style contracts are more appropriate when rule of law is low.  There are two caveats to this 
interpretation.  First, U.S. contracts make the highest use of control and liquidation provisions 
despite the U.S. having the highest rule of law.  Second, the results are largely driven by the fact 
that non-U.S. contracts are more typical in Scandinavian countries that have a high rule of law.
Apart from the legal system, corporate governance also may be affected by a country’s 
accounting system (see Bushman and Smith (2001)).  This should be more important for 
contingencies or milestones that use accounting-based performance measures.  Under a less 
reliable accounting system, such milestones might be less feasible, leading to fewer 
contingencies.  In the second column of table 3, we consider how the contracts in our sample 
vary with the accounting standards of the company’s country using the measure of accounting 
standards from LaPorta et al. (1997).  The column indicates that the contracts are qualitatively 
identical across countries with strong and poor accounting standards. 
Third, contracts may be affected by the strength of a country’s bankruptcy laws and 
creditor protection.  We use the index of creditor protection calculated in LaPorta et al. (1997).
One might expect creditor protection to have an effect on liquidation rights.  On the other hand, 
the creditor protection index reflects the efficacy of bankruptcy laws which may not be relevant 
for VC investments that consist largely of equity securities.  Column 3 of table 3 indicates that 
contracts in high creditor protection countries have greater liquidation rights and make greater 
use of exit provisions.  Again, the caveat to this result is that U.S. contracts have strong 
8 We assume that this measure (and other various measures we use), calculated in LaPorta et al. (1997), are still 
valid for our slightly later sample period. 13
liquidation rights, but the U.S. has the lowest creditor protection score. 
Next, we consider differences in minority shareholder protection.  We use the index of 
shareholder protection calculated in LaPorta et al. (1997). To the extent that minority 
shareholders are not protected, it may be more important for the VCs to get explicit control 
rights.  On the other hand, this measure reflects the protection of minority shareholders of 
publicly traded companies and, therefore, may not be so relevant for investments in private 
companies.  Column four of table 3 indicates that there are no substantive differences across low 
and high minority protection countries. 
Fifth, we consider restrictions on the ability of corporations to buy back their own shares.
Such restrictions are potentially important in that they might make it more difficult to implement 
redemption and vesting provisions that typically require the company to repurchase shares.  We 
distinguish between countries in which companies can or cannot repurchase more than ten 
percent of their shares (See Sabri (2002)).  Column five of table 3 indicates that differences in 
repurchase rules are unrelated to the contract provisions in our sample.   
  Sixth, we consider the tax environment that firms face.  One area where taxation 
differences might play an important role in contract design is the tax treatment of equity-based 
compensation (including employee stock options).   The European Venture Capital Association 
(see EVCA (2001)) argues that the heavy taxation of stock option grants in Europe hampers the 
ability of investors to provide incentives to portfolio company management.  The EVCA’s 
lobbying activity has recently led several countries to change their tax rules for employee stock 
options to more closely resemble the U.S. treatment.
9
  We distinguish between countries with favorable and unfavorable taxation of stock 14
options.  We code as unfavorable those tax regimes that tax stock option gains at vesting (rather 
than at exercise or sale) or tax option gains at marginal tax rates that exceed 40%.  We might 
expect to see less incentive compensation and less use of vesting in countries with unfavorable 
taxation.  Column six of table 3 indicates that the only significant difference across favorable and 
unfavorable tax regimes is the use of anti-dilution provisions that are not particularly related to 
tax.  Vesting provisions are more common in favorable tax regimes, but not significantly so. 
  We then consider the liquidity of the stock markets in the portfolio company countries.   
Black and Gilson (1998) argue that an active venture capital market relies heavily on the VCs’ 
ability to exit their portfolio investments through a public offering.  In support of this argument, 
Jeng and Wells (2000) find that VC investing is higher in countries with greater numbers and 
values of initial public offerings of stock (IPOs).  We distinguish IPO activity by whether the 
country had more than thirty IPOs in 1999.
10  We might expect the strength of exit provisions to 
be related to this measure.  In column 7 of table 3, the only significant difference across IPO 
activity is that ordinary common is more prevalent in countries with high IPO activity. 
  Finally, we consider a measure of the efficiency of the legal system.  We use the ‘Lex 
Mundi formalism score’ from Djankov et. al. (2002) that measures the amount of time it takes 
the legal system to deal with collecting on a bounced check.   One might expect that VCs would 
require more control and liquidation rights in regimes with less efficient legal systems.  There is 
some modest support for this.  Liquidation rights and exit provisions are somewhat stronger in 
more formal (less efficient) legal systems. 
Overall, then, the direct measures of legal, tax, and accounting institutions that we have 
9 Also, see Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) for a discussion of the impact of capital gains taxation on VC activity. 15
explored are moderately successful although not uniformly so in explaining the previous results 
on the relation of the contracts to legal origin.   
3.4  Implementation of U.S. style contracts outside the U.S. 
The modest results in the previous section suggest that legal, tax, and institutional 
differences are only part of the story in explaining the observed distribution of contracts.  In this 
section, we obtain support for this conjecture by finding that some VCs implement U.S. style 
contracts in all of the countries in which they invest.  Table 4 summarizes this discussion. 
First, even if convertible preferred stock is disfavored in corporate law, it is generally 
possible to use senior common stock or combinations of common and non-convertible preferred 
stock or debt to mimic the control and liquidation rights of convertible preferred.
Second, even if the legal regime makes it difficult to impose standard anti-dilution 
provisions, it is generally possible to mimic those provisions using warrants that are exercisable 
conditional on a subsequent financing at a lower valuation. 
Third, even if vesting and other contingencies are hampered by unfavorable tax laws, it is 
generally possible to use put options on the entrepreneur’s stock that are exercisable by the VC if 
the entrepreneur leaves or misbehaves.  In countries where additional equity for the entrepreneur 
is taxed as compensation, it is possible to provide contingent equity by making the valuation or 
financing contingent rather than the entrepreneur’s equity stake.
Fourth, it seems unlikely that legal differences could explain the absence of liquidation 
preference.  VCs can use seniority clauses in all of the countries in our sample.
10 While this is admittedly a coarse measure of IPO activity, our results are qualitatively identical using other 
measures, including the value of IPOs and both the number and value normalized by population or GDP.   16
Fifth, even if redemption rights are infeasible due to restrictions on a company buying 
back its own stock, the VC can mimic these rights by combining a senior claim with drag-along 
rights.  This effectively gives the VC the right to liquidate because drag-along rights force all 
shareholders to sell when the senior claimant decides to sell even if the senior claimant gets all or 
most of the proceeds. 
Sixth, if the local legal, tax, and institutional environment simply gets too restrictive, it is 
generally possible to reincorporate the company in a country that is less restrictive.  As column 3 
of table 1 shows, 21% of the companies in our sample do reincorporate in another country.
There is a net flow of companies from countries of German and Scandinavian legal origin to 
countries of common law origin. 
These six examples indicate that while it may not be easy or obvious how to adapt a 
particular contract, with enough effort and legal expertise, it appears possible to replicate most 
U.S. style contractual mechanisms elsewhere. 
3.5  Relation to VC experience and sophistication
The previous section describes how some VCs are able to get around institutional 
constraints to implement U.S. style contracts.  In this section, we examine the characteristics of 
those VCs who do so.  For each financing, we identify the lead VC as the VC who invests the 
greatest amount in that financing.  The lead VC typically plays the greatest role in negotiating 
the contract with the entrepreneur.
In our analysis, we attempt to distinguish among the lead VCs by experience and 
sophistication using three different variables.  First, we distinguish between smaller and larger 
VCs, using a breakpoint of (the sample median of) $200 million under management.  Second, we 
distinguish between younger and older VC firms, using a breakpoint of (the sample median age 17
of) four years.  Third, we classify VCs according to their familiarity with the U.S.  21 financings 
were led by VCs based in the U.S.; 87 financings were led by VCs who had previously 
syndicated (or invested) with U.S. VCs; and 37 financings were led by VCs with no U.S. 
experience.  We determined if the VC had U.S. experience by examining the Venture Economics 
financing database, the VentureOne financing database, and the individual VC websites. 
Table 5 indicates that U.S. style provisions are positively and significantly correlated 
with all three VC experience variables.  Larger and older VCs, and VCs with U.S. experience are 
all more likely to use convertible or participating preferred, stronger liquidation preferences, and 
stronger exit provisions.  Larger and older VCs own a larger percentage of fully diluted equity.
Older VCs and VCs with U.S. experience also use more time vesting, have stronger anti-dilution 
protection, and are less likely to leave the founder with board control. It is only in the use of 
milestones where there are no clear differences across VC experience.   
The strong results for VC experience contrast with the modest results for legal, tax, and 
accounting institutions.  The multivariate analysis in section 4 will address the relative 
importance of these factors. 
3.6  Relation to financing round characteristics
It also is possible that the contractual characteristics vary with other characteristics of the 
financing round.  Accordingly, our final univariate analysis considers how contractual 
characteristics vary with the size of the investment, whether the investment is the first by a VC, 
and the age of the portfolio company.  
Column 1 of table 6 shows that larger financing rounds (greater than $3 million) tend to 
use more U.S. style contracts.  Larger rounds are less likely to use ordinary common, have 
stronger liquidation preferences, stronger exit provisions, and more VC board control.  Not 18
surprisingly, larger rounds also are associated with greater VC percentage ownership.   
Column 2 of table 6 indicates that subsequent VC rounds also make somewhat greater 
use of U.S. style contracts.  Subsequent VC rounds are less likely to use ordinary common, have 
marginally stronger liquidation preferences, and more VC board control.  VC percentage 
ownership also increases in later rounds. 
Finally, column 3 of table 6 shows that younger portfolio companies are somewhat more 
likely to have U.S. style contracts.  They are more likely to use convertible preferred, have 
stronger liquidation preferences and stronger exit provisions.
4. Multivariate  results 
  At this point, we have found that VC contracts are related to a country’s legal origin and 
to measures of VC experience or sophistication.  The contracts also are related to deal 
characteristics and legal, accounting and institutional features.  In this section, we assess the 
relative importance of these different variables using multiple regression analyses.   
In the first set of regressions, the dependent variable is an index of U.S. style terms.  We 
form the index as the sum of dummy variables for the presence of vesting, milestones, anti-
dilution rights, liquidation preference (at least equal to investment), redemption rights, and (non-
founder) board control.  The index, therefore, varies from zero to six.  We estimate the models 
using Poisson regressions.  In the second set of regressions, we estimate models using dummy 
variables for the individual measures of cash flow, liquidation and control rights. 
The regressions include independent variables that measure legal regime and VC 
experience.  Most of the regressions measure legal origin as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
portfolio company is in a country with a common law legal origin.  We also estimate some 
regressions using the indices for legal formalism (Lex Mundi), accounting standards, creditor 19
protection, minority protection, and the dummy for option taxation.
11  All of the regressions 
include a dummy variable for whether the VC is U.S. based.  The regressions also include an 
additional VC experience variable:  non-U.S. VC who has syndicated (invested) with a U.S. VC, 
the VC age at the time of the financing, or the logarithm of VC funds under management.   
All of the regressions control for the portfolio company age and if the financing is the 
first VC round.  Some of the regressions include controls for industry (software and Internet, 
hardware, telecom, and life science), year of investment, deal size and if the portfolio company 
reincorporated from its home country to a different one.  All standard errors are clustered by lead 
VC to avoid overweighting VCs with more observations.  We obtain (but do not present) 
statistically similar results when we cluster by year or industry. 
Panel A of table 7 presents the Poisson regressions for our index. The regressions show 
that the VC experience variables dominate the legal, accounting and institutional variables.  The 
VC experience variables, particularly VC based in the U.S. and non-U.S. VC with U.S. V.C. 
syndication experience, are significant in every specification. In contrast, the legal regime, 
accounting and institutional variables are not significant in any specification.
The economic magnitudes of the VC experience variables are also substantial.   For 
example, non-U.S. VCs who have syndicated with U.S. VCs include almost two additional U.S. 
style provisions in their financings.  This compares to coefficients (marginal effects) of 0.0 to 
0.46 for the common law dummy variable that are never significant. 
Some of the control variables also are significant.  Younger portfolio companies are less 
likely to use U.S. style provisions, while larger deals are more likely to include such 
11 The reported regressions do not include share repurchase restrictions or IPO activity.  When these variables are 
included, they are never significant. 20
provisions.
12  In the last regression in panel A, first VC financings are associated with 
significantly fewer (-0.56) U.S. style provisions.  At the same time, portfolio companies 
receiving their first VC financing in 2001 use significantly more (1.33) U.S. style provisions than 
those receiving their first VC financing earlier. This is consistent with the overall VC market 
converging toward U.S. style contracts over time.   
In panels B and C of table 7, we estimate probit and ordered probit regressions using 
dependent variables that measure the individual provisions:  (i) whether the round uses 
convertible or participating preferred;
13 (ii) whether the round uses founder vesting; (iii) whether 
the round uses milestones; (iv)  whether the round uses anti-dilution protection; (v) whether the 
liquidation preference is less than, equal to, or greater than the amount invested; (vi) whether the 
round uses redemption rights; and (vii) whether the founder has control,  shares control, or does 
not have control of the board.
In panel B of table 7, we estimate the regressions with the common law dummy and the 
VC experience variables.  Again, the regressions strongly suggest that VC experience dominates 
the effect of legal origin.  The common law dummy is significant only for the use of anti-dilution 
provisions.  In contrast, both (1) VC based in the U.S. and (2) non-U.S. VC with U.S. 
syndication experience are individually significant in all but one specification.  One of the two is 
significant in every specification.  The reported marginal effects of the VC experience variables 
are also economically larger than those for the common law variable. 
Panel C of table 7 uses the more detailed legal, accounting and tax variables.  We lose 
some observations because we do not have the relevant indices for all of the countries in our 
12 In most of the regressions, we do not control for deal size because it is arguably endogenous with the contracts.  
13 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively identical when we use a dummy for ordinary common stock. 21
sample.  Again, the VC experience variables are economically and statistically significant in all 
but one specification.  Only in the milestone regression are they both insignificant.  (None of the 
other variables are significant in this regression.)
In contrast, the legal, accounting and tax variables are only occasionally successful in 
explaining the use of U.S.-style contracts.  In five of the seven regressions, none of the variables 
is significant at better than the 5% level.  Accounting standards are significantly related to time 
vesting although not to milestones.  Minority protection is negatively related to liquidation 
preferences, while creditor protection is positively related.
Overall, then, table 7 shows that the VC experience variables consistently dominate the 
legal, accounting and institutional variables in both economic and statistical significance. 
5.  The relation of contractual terms to VC survival. 
The analysis so far suggests that more experienced VCs implement U.S. style contracts 
across many different legal regimes.  One interpretation of this result is that more experienced 
VCs are superior investors who should use more efficient contracts.  Under this interpretation, 
U.S. style contracts are optimal or, at least, the most effective of available contracts.  This 
interpretation is consistent with Kaplan and Schoar (forthcoming) who find that more 
experienced VCs outperform less experienced VCs.
Alternatively, one might interpret the results simply as finding that VCs use the contracts 
with which they are familiar.  Because the more experienced VCs are more familiar with U.S. 
contracts, they use them regardless of whether they are optimal.   
In this section, we attempt to distinguish between those two interpretations by looking at 
the ex post performance of the lead VCs in our sample.  If the first interpretation is accurate, then 
the VCs who use U.S. style contracts should be more successful than those who do not.  Under 22
the second interpretation, we would not expect to see a large difference.
There are seventy different lead VCs in our sample financings.  Although we cannot 
collect the ex post VC returns, we can observe whether the VC firms are still operating entities.  
We used Venture Economics, VentureOne, and the VC firm websites to determine the current 
status of the VC firms.  Table 8 reports that as of August 2003, fifty-nine of the seventy lead 
VCs were still active and independent while eleven had failed or had been acquired.
14
In table 8, we classify the VCs according to whether they always used, sometimes used, 
or never used convertible or participating preferred stock.  The use of such securities is a simple 
univariate measure of the use U.S. style contracts.  In the multivariate analysis in table 9, we also 
use the index of U.S. style provisions. 
The results in table 8 are highly statistically significant.  Of the twenty-nine VCs that 
never used preferred stock, 34% (or ten) have not survived.  Of the thirty-seven VCs that always 
used preferred stock, none has failed.  The four VCs who sometimes used preferred stock fall in 
between with one of the four having not survived.  Said another way, ten of the eleven VCs that 
did not survive did not ever use preferred stock. It is also worth noting that the four VCs who 
sometimes used preferred stock always switched to preferred stock from some other security. 
The rest of table 8 separates VCs based in common law countries from VCs based in non-
common law countries.  The outcomes for VCs in non-common law countries drive the results.  
Still, the one failed VC firm in a common law country was one that never used preferred stock. 
While suggestive, the univariate results may be driven by correlations between contracts 
and VC or portfolio company characteristics.  To address this possibility, we estimate probit 
regressions of the relation of VC survival to VC contracts controlling for VC fund and portfolio 23
company characteristics.   
In the regressions, the dependent variable equals one if the VC survived.  We measure 
contracting in two ways.  First, we use a dummy variable equal to one if the VC always used 
preferred stock.  Second, we use the average value of the U.S. style contract index for the sample 
deals in which the VC was the lead VC.  As control variables, we include dummy variables for 
whether the VC is an early stage investor (as a measure of risk)
15, whether the VC is controlled 
by a financial institution or other corporation, whether the VC is in a common law country, and 
the (log of) VC funds under management.   
In table 9, the contracting variables are significant in all specifications.  The index 
variable is smaller in magnitude and significance in the fourth specification.  This may be 
partially due to a smaller number of observations.  The only non-contracting variable that is 
significant is VC funds under management in the fourth regression (which is associated with an 
increased likelihood of survival).
Tables 8 and 9 show that more successful VCs use U.S. style contracts.  In the spirit of 
Fama and Jensen (1983), one interpretation of this result is that U.S. style contracts are more 
efficient:  (1) VCs using U.S. style contracts are more likely to survive and; (2) to the extent that 
VCs changed their contracting style, they moved to the U.S. style contracts.
16
  An alternative interpretation is that VCs who used U.S. style contracts did better ex post, 
but may not have been expected to do better ex ante, particularly in light of the tech “crash” of 
2000 to 2002.  By this argument, U.S. style contracts provide better downside protection, but do 
14 A VC firm is typically acquired only when the firm’s investments are not performing well. 
15 We obtain similar results when we use the percentage of a VC’s sample deals that are first rounds and the average 
portfolio company age of the VC’s sample deals. 
16 This interpretation is consistent with U.S. style contracts providing better outcomes, but does not prove causation. 24
less well when the portfolio companies succeed.  We think this interpretation is unsatisfactory 
for two reasons.  First, the theories that focus on control and liquidation rights, e.g., Aghion and 
Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore (1998), predict that those rights will be most important in the 
bad or downside states of the world.  Second, we consider in table 10 whether the VCs in our 
sample trade off downside protection for reduced upside and fail to find such a relation.
In table 10, we test for a negative relation between the use of U.S. style terms and 
measures of VC upside.  The first set of regressions uses the pre-money value of the financing 
round as a dependent variable.  The pre-money value is the implicit valuation of the 
entrepreneur’s (pre-VC) equity in the financing round.  If there is a trade off, the pre-money 
value will be increasing in U.S. style terms.  I.e., the VC gets more U.S. style terms, but gives a 
higher valuation to the entrepreneur.  The second set of regressions uses the percentage of equity 
(cash flow rights) that the VC gets in the financing round. If there is a trade off, the VCs 
percentage equity will be decreasing in U.S. style terms.  If anything, the results in table 10 
indicate that more U.S. style terms are associated with more VC upside, not less.  These results 
hold controlling for VC experience and other control variables.
6.  Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we compare VC contracts in twenty-three other countries to those in the 
U.S.   We analyze how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control 
rights.  In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes.  In particular, U.S. style 
contracts are more typical in common law countries.  However, there appear to be few 
institutional impediments to implementing U.S.-style terms.  More experienced VCs are able to 
implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime.  In multivariate specifications, 
measures of VC experience are more influential than legal regime or other legal, accounting, and 25
institutional variables.  Finally, we consider the subsequent survival rate of the lead VCs in our 
sample.  VCs who use U.S.-style contracts are substantially and significantly less likely to fail.
Furthermore, the VCs who switched styles all moved from non-U.S. to U.S. style contracts. 
We think the most plausible interpretation of our results is as follows.  The contracts in 
the U.S. have developed over several business cycles and are effective.  The results in Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2003) suggest that many elements of these U.S. contracts are consistent with the 
predictions of optimal contracting theories.  Venture capital investing outside of the U.S. is 
relatively more recent and the legal rules are different.  Learning about optimal or effective 
contracts takes time and effort.  Even in cases where VCs would like to implement U.S. style 
contracts, it may not be costless to do so.  If contracts are important for VC success, VCs using 
efficient contracts will be more likely to survive and surviving VCs will be more likely to switch 
to more efficient contracts.  Furthermore, one might expect the evolution to accelerate in periods 
of high volatility such as the tech crash after 2000.  This interpretation is supported by the 
survival results, the switching results, and the finding that first VC financings at the end our 
sample use significantly more U.S. style provisions. 
This interpretation also is suggested by our personal experience.  When one of the co-
authors collected the data in 2000, he asked one of the VCs why the VC did not use U.S. style 
contracts.  The VC responded that he “did not think it mattered.”  Two years later, in early 2002, 
when the technology market was depressed, the co-author met the VC again.  The VC 
complained that he wanted to exert control in or force a sale of several of his portfolio company 
investments, but was unable to do so.  The VC acknowledged that the contracts did matter.  A 
year later, in 2003, the VC was out of business.  From talking to VCs and lawyers, it is our 
understanding that in 2004 most VC deals in that country use U.S. style contacts.
  We believe the results have implications for the law and finance literature.  The intuitions 26
and predictions of financial contracting theories appear to be valid across different institutional 
and legal regimes.  Based on this, we would expect more convergence toward U.S. style 
contracts in the future.  The results also suggest that it is beneficial for less experienced, local 
investors to syndicate with and learn from more experienced, multinational investors. 
One caveat to our results and predictions is that they are based on start-ups largely in 
developed countries.  There are two forces that may favor convergence for these types of firms.  
First, enforcement of laws is generally not a major problem in most of the countries we study.   
Second, it may be easier to write desirable contracts for new businesses than for existing ones.
The somewhat different results in Lerner and Schoar (2003) for private equity investments in 
developing countries suggest that either or both of these forces may be important.   
In fact, our results in conjunction with those of Lerner and Schoar (2003) are consistent 
with the findings and conjectures in Acemoglu and Johnson (2003).   Our results suggest that 
sophisticated investors contract around existing contracting institutions to implement similar 
(optimal) contracts for (i) start-ups located in countries in which property rights are enforced; 
and (ii) for start-ups in developing countries with poor property right enforcement that are able to 
reincorporate in countries in which property rights are enforced.  It may be more difficult for 
more mature companies in developing countries to incorporate elsewhere.
17
17 Qian and Strahan (2004) study a sample of international bank loans and draw similar conclusions. 27
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US 0  0  0  /  10  13  10  71  0.40  847  1  5  2.60  Yes. 
Hong Kong  1  1  0 / 0  0  8.22  69  0.15  64  4  5  0.73  Yes. 
India 4  4  1  /  0  2  4.17  57  0  52  4  5  3.34  Yes. 
Ireland 7  3 0  /  0  1  7.8  .  0.44  6  1  4  2.63  No. 
Israel 15  7  3  /  0  4  4.82  64  0  28  4  3  3.30  No. 
Singapore 2  1  0  /  0  1  8.57  78  0.28 70  4  4  2.50  Yes. 
UK 10  9  1  /  2  9  8.57  78  0  293  4  5  2.58  Yes. 
Common law  39 25  5  /  15
1 30                 
                       
Belgium 5  4  0  /  0  3 10  61  0  18  2  0  2.73  No. 
France 13  11  3  /  0  4  8.98  69 0.40  78  0 3  3.23  No. 
Greece 2  2 2  /  0  1  6.18  55 .  45  1  2  3.99  No. 
Luxembourg 1  1  0  /  1  0  10  .  0.53  16  .  .  3.56  . 
Netherlands 5  2  0  /  5  2  10  64  0  18  2  2  3.07  No. 
French law  26 20  5  /  6 10                 
                       
Austria 1 1 0  /  1  1  10  54 0.61  6  3  2  3.52  No. 
Germany 14 10  0  /  0 6  9.23  62  0.56  160  3  1 3.51  No. 
Korea 1  1  0  /  0  0  5.35  62  . 10  3 2  3.37  Yes. 
Switzerland 27  20  5  /  0  10  10  68  0  23  1  2  3.13  Yes. 
German law  43 32  5  /  1 17                 
                       
Denmark 3  2  1  /  0 2  10  62  0.63  7  3  2 2.55  No. 
Finland 2 2  1  /  0  0  10  77 .  24  1  3  3.14  No. 
Iceland 1 1 1  /  0  0  10  .  0.10  9  .  .  4.13  No. 
Norway 3 1  1  /  0  1  10  74  0.63  18  2  4  2.95  No. 
Sweden 23  21 2  /  0  9  10  83  0.73  50  2  3  2.98  No. 
                       
Scandin. law  32 27  5  /  0 12                 
                       
Hungary 2  1  0  /  0 0 .  .  0.61  7  .  .  3.42  . 
Czech Rep.  1  1  1 / 0  0  .  .  .  .  .  .  4.03  . 
China 2  1  1  /  0  0  .  .  . .  . .  3.41  . 
Socialist 
background 
5 3  2  /  0  0                
                       
Total  145  107  22 / 22                 
                                                          
1 Includes one company reincorporated in Bahamas and two in Bermuda. B.: Year of VC financing:
 Pre  1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 Unknown
First financing round for co.  8  11  23  41  14  10 
Financing rounds in sample  7  16  27  63  31  1 
C.  Industry Distribution of Companies 




Telecom Life  Science  Other/Unknown 
Companies    62 13 12 12 8 
Fin.  rounds  88 18 14 17 8 
      
D  Other deal characteristics 









Earliest round we have for each company  88.9%  2.2 (1.0)  67.3%  6.2 (3.1)   
All financing rounds we have  66.9% 2.5  (1.0)  65.5% 6.8  (3.4)   
N 133 134 139 127  Table 2 
VC contract characteristics across legal regimes 
Contract characteristics for 145 investments in 107 portfolio companies from 18 countries by 69 different lead VCs between 
1992 and 2001. Except where noted, the numbers in the table denotes the fraction of investments in the sample exhibiting a 
certain contract characteristics.  U.S. sample statistics are taken from Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).  ‘Legal regime’ is taken 
from LaPorta et al (1997).  Contractual provisions are explained in the text.  Contract characteristics differ significantly across
sub-samples the:   1% ***;  5% **, and 10% * levels.  









A. Main VC security:
Convertible preferred  53.8%  95.2%  66.7% 53.8% 48.8% 37.5% 100.0%*
Ordinary common stock  27.6%  0.5%  7.7% 19.2%  37.2% 50.0% 0.0%**
Senior common stock  14.5%  1.0%  25.6% 19.2% 11.6% 3.1%  0.0% 
Convertible debt  2.0%  1.9%  0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 6,2% 0.0% 
Other security  2.0%  1.0%  0.0% 3.8% 2.3% 3.1% 0.0% 
Sample size  145  213  39 26 43 32 5 
B. Residual cash flow rights and incentive mechanisms:
VC equity %,  milestones met 















Sample size  130  212  37 25 39 24 5 
Founder stock vests over time  37.20%  43.6%  50.0% 20.0% 31.6% 46.7% 50.0% 
                      Sample size  121  212  24 25 38 30 4 
Equity or funding milestones  38.90%  53.0%  29.6% 41.7% 42.5% 36.7% 60.0% 
                      Sample size  126  212  27 24 40 30 5 
VC anti-dilution protection  56.40%  94.60%  88.5% 73.9% 50.0% 25.8% 50.0%***
                      Sample size    213  26 23 40 31 4 
C. Size of VC liquidation preference:
Less than invested funds  34.10%  3.00%  10.7% 25.0% 39.0% 59.4% 0.0%**
Equal to invested funds  17.80%  28.70%  39.3% 8.3%  17.1% 9.4%  0.0%**
More than invested funds  48.10%  68.40%  50.0% 66.7% 43.9% 31.2% 100.0%**
Cumulative dividends  20.60%  43.8%  7.8% 20.8%  17.1% 29.0% 75.0% 
Participating preferred  
(or equivalent) 
34.60%  48.0%  48.2% 37.5% 29.3% 29.0% 25.0% 
Other “booster” (e.g. 3x)  15.10%  2.4%  3.8% 20.8%  19.5% 6.4%  75.0% 
Sample size  129  213  28 24 41 32 4 
D. VC exit provisions:
VC has redemption rights  34.5%  71.8%  41.0% 34.6% 30.2% 28.1% 60.0% 
Other senior exit mechanism  50.0%  - 66.7% 63.6% 45.7% 28.6% 75.0% 
No senior exit mechanism  36.6%  28.2%  25.6% 26.9% 39.5% 56.2% 20.0% 
Sample size  145  213  39 26 43 32 5 
E. Board control
No. board seats, mean (med)  5.7 (5.0)  6.0 (6.0)  6.0 (6.3)  5.8 (5.0)  4.8 (5.0)  5.7 (5.0)  6.5 (7.0)**
% VC board seats  37.0 (40.0)  41.4 (40.0)  32.0 (33.3)  40.4 (40.0)  42.2 (33.3)  34.3 (40.0)  38.6 (34.3) 
Degree of board control:   
Founder controls board  27.6%  13.9%  18.0% 46.2% 18.6% 34.4% 40.0% 
Neither / state-contingent   60.0%  60.7%  71.8% 42.3% 65.1% 56.2% 40.0% 
VC controls board  12.4%  25.4%  10.3% 11.5% 16.3% 9.4%  20.0% 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 4 
Implementation of U.S. style contracts outside the U.S. 
U.S. contractual feature  Purpose and potential institutional 
obstacles
Alternative implementation
Convertible preferred stock  Purpose: Allocates cash-flow and 
control rights between VC and 
entrepreneur. 
 Problem: Convertible preferred stock 
disfavored in corporate law.  
Common + Straight preferred stock. 
Common + Zero-coupon debt. 
Senior common stock with liquidation 
preference. 
Convertible debt. 
Anti-dilution rights (Full ratchet): Upon a 
subsequent financing at a valuation lower 
than the original financing, the 
conversion price of the original 
convertible preferred stock is adjusted 
downward to the issuance price of the 
dilutive financing.  Written into the 
articles of incorporation. 
Purpose: Protect VC from subsequent 
dilutive financing rounds.  
Problem: Various, restrictions e.g. : 
Convertible preferred stock 
disfavored in corporate law;  
shareholder vote needed for 
adjustment to conversion price. 
Anti-dilution warrants: Warrants attached to 
the VC’s stock can be exercised by an investor 
in case of a capital increase or in case of an 
issuance of stock to finance the acquisition of 
another company, given that the price per 
share involved is below the original 
subscription price. The number of shares to be 
acquired this way will be such that the 
resulting price obtained by the investors after 
these transactions is equal to the original 
subscription price. 
Vesting Provisions: Company will have a 
repurchase option to buy back at cost a 
portion of the shares of common stock 
held by a certain shareholder (founder)  if 
such shareholder's employment with the 
company ends before some specified 
date.   A portion will be released each 
month from the repurchase option  based 
upon continued employment. 
Purpose:  Make it costly for founder 
to leave firm prematurely. Increase 
pay-performance sensitivity.  
Problem: Vesting of shares may be 
treated as income, and as a result 
vested shares are taxed at the ordinary 
income tax rate upon the vesting date. 
“Good leaver” and “bad leaver” provisions: 
(example) 
“ ‘Good leavers’ (i.e founder employees 
voluntarily terminating their employment 
contract with the company) shall offer their 
shares in the company to the other 
shareholders at a price incorporating a 
considerable penalty.  
‘Bad leavers’ (i.e. founders being terminated 
as a result of material breach by the founder 
employees of the applicable terms and 
conditions of their employment contract with 
the company) shall offer their shares to the 
other shareholders of the company at a price 
corresponding to the valuation of the last 
financing less 25%. Agreement will terminate 
upon an IPO or a sale of the company.” 
Equity milestones: Upon company 
reaching a performance milestone, 
additional shares will be issued to 
founders.  
Purpose: Increase pay-performance 
sensitivity. 
Problem: Granting shares to founders 
treated as income, and granted shares 
taxed at the ordinary income tax rate. 
Contingent valuations:  Upon company 
reaching a performance milestone, investors 
will put in additional funds in the company.  
Redemption provisions: (example) At the 
election of the holders of a majority of the 
preferred, the Company shall redeem the 
outstanding preferred shares in two equal 
installments beginning on the fifth 
anniversary of the prior preferred closing 
date. 
Puirpose: To be able to exit an 
unsuccessful investment.  
Problem: Share repurchases restricted 
by corporate law.  
Drag-along provision: After five years, if 
investors offer to sell their shares to a 3
rd party, 
it may require all the other shareholders also to 
sell or dispose of their shares on a pro rata 
basis and on the same terms to the 3
rd  party. 
Other exit provision: If listing does not occur 
in five years, the parties agree that upon 
request of the majority of investors, the 
company shall instruct an investment bank to 
find a buyer for all of the company’s shares.Table 5 
VC contract characteristics and Lead VC experience 
Contract characteristics for 145 investments in 107 portfolio companies from 18 countries by 69 different lead VCs between 
1992 and 2001. The ‘Lead VC’ is defined as the VC committing the largest amount of funds in the syndicate in the current 
financing round. ‘VC from US’ is a dummy equal to one if the Lead VC investor is located in the United States.  ‘Syndicated 
with U.S. VC’ is a dummy equal to one if the Lead VC investor is (1) not located in the United States, and (2) had either 
previously invested in a portfolio company located in the United States or co-invested with a U.S.-based VC at the time of the 
financing.  ‘No US exp.’ is a dummy equal to one if both previous dummy variables are zero.  Contractual provisions are 
significantly different across sub-samples at the:   1% ***;  5% **, and 10% * levels. Tests for degree of liquidation preference
and degree of board control are joint across the three degrees of liquidation preference / board control, using a Kruskal-Wallis
test. All other tests refer to differences in median tests, using a rank-sum test. 
  Lead VC funds under 
management 
Lead VC age  Lead VC degree of U.S. experience 





A. Main VC security:            
Conv. / part. preferred  80.8%  26.4%*** 76.7%  30.6%*** 94.7%  62.1%  10.8%***
Ordinary common stock 13.7%  41.7%*** 16.4%  38.9%*** 0.0%  18.4%  64.9%***
Common w. liq. preference  4.1%  25.0%*** 2.7%  26.4%*** 0.0%  18.4%  13.5% 
Convertible  debt  0.0% 4.2%  1.4% 2.8%  0.0%  0.0%  8.1% 
Other  1.4%  2.8%  2.7%  1.4%  5.4% 1.2% 2.7% 
Sample  size  73 72  73 72  37  87  37 
             
B. Residual cash flow rights and incentive mechanisms:       
VC equity %  40.8%  31.5%*** 39.7%  33.3%** 45.2%  35.6%  34.0% 
No. of obs  67  63  61  69  17  80  31 
Founder time vesting  35.20% 38.80%  50.9% 25.0%*** 66.7%  40.3%  18.8%**
               Sample size  54  67  57  64  15  72  32 
Equity / funding milestones  33.90%  43.30% 45.90%  32.30% 25.0% 48.0% 22.6%*
               Sample size  59  67  61  65  16  77  31 
VC anti-dilution protection  61.80% 52.20%  73.3% 40.6%*** 86.7%  67.6%  18.2%***
              Sample size  55  69  60  64  15  74  33 
           
C. Liquidation pref.:             
Less than invested funds 17.2%  47.9%*** 24.6%  42.6%*** 0.0%  22.4%  77.1%***
Equal to invested funds  5.2%  28.2%*** 9.8%  25.0%*** 18.8%  21.0%  11.4%***
More than invested funds 77.6%  23.9%*** 65.6%  32.4%*** 81.2%  56.6%  11.4%***
Cumulative dividends 32.1%  11.4%*** 31.7%  10.6%*** 25.0%  25.3%  9.1% 
Part. pref. (or equiv.) 57.9%  15.7%*** 45.0%  25.4%** 62.5%  42.1%  0.0%***
Other “booster” (e.g. 3x)  17.9% 12.9%  23.3% 7.6%** 12.5%  17.3%  12.1% 
Sample  size  58 71  61 68  16  76  35 
           
D. Exit provisions:             
VC has redemption rights  46.6%  22.2%*** 48.0%  20.8%*** 63.2%  35.6%  18.9%**
Other senior exit 
mechanism 
55.1% 45.9%  48.8% 51.7%  33.3% 62.7% 24.1%***
No senior exit mechanism  24.7%  48.6%*** 30.1%  43.1%  21.0% 28.7% 64.9%***
Sample  size  73 72  73 72  19  87  37 
             
E. Board control             
No. seats, total, mean (med)  5.9 (5.5)  5.5 (5.0)  6.1 (6.0) 5.3  (5.0) **  6.2 (6.5)  5.6 (6.0)  5.6 (5.0) 
% VC board seats  40.9 (40.0)  34.0 (33.3)**  39.3 (40.0)  35.5 (33.3)  46.8 (42.9)  36.6 (33.3)  34.4 (31.0)**
Degree of board control:               
Founder controls board  21.90% 33.30%  19.2% 36.1%** 5.3%  26.4%  37.8%**
Neither / state-contingent  65.80%  54.20%  67.1% 52.8%** 63.2%  63.2%  54.0%**
VC controls board  12.30% 12.50%  13.7% 11.1%** 31.6%  10.3%  8.1%**
No.  obs.  73 72  73 72  19  87  37 Table 6 
VC contracts and deal characteristics 
Contract characteristics for 145 investments in 107 portfolio companies from 18 countries by 69 different lead VCs between 
1992 and 2001. ‘Funds committed’ is the total VC funds committed in the financing round, expressed in U.S. dollars. Country, 
deal and investor characteristics are significantly different at the:   1% ***;  5% **, and 10% * levels. Tests for degree of 
liquidation preference and degree of board control are joint across the three degrees of liquidation preference / board control,
using a Kruskal-Wallis test. All other tests refer to differences in median tests, using a rank-sum test. 
  Funds committed  First VC investment  Firm age 
A. Main VC security: >$3M <$3M First  round Subs.  round  < 2 years  >= 2 years
Conv. / part. preferred  68.2%  31.6%*** 44.9%  77.3%*** 61.0%  40.0%**
Ordinary common stock 21.6%  36.8%** 31.5%  11.4%** 23.2%  36.0% 
Common w. liq. preference  9.1%  22.8%** 18.0%  11.4%  11.6% 20.0% 
Convertible  debt  0.0% 5.3%  3.4% 0.0%  2.1% 2.0% 
Other  1.1% 3.5%  2.3% 0.0%  2.1% 2.0% 
Number  of  observations  88 57  89 44  95 50 
          
B. Residual cash flow rights 
and incentive mechanisms:
         
VC equity %  41.7%  28.7%*** 31.1%  48.2%*** 38.1%  32.1%*
Number  of  observations  76 54  82 42  90 40 
          
Founder time vesting  40.0%  33.3% 39.0%  34.4% 42.1% 28.9% 
Number  of  observations  70 51  77 32  76 45 
          
Equity / funding milestones  43.1%  33.3% 39.0%  29.0% 37.5%  41.3% 
Number  of  observations  72 54  77 38  80 46 
          
VC anti-dilution protection  62.0% 49.1%  52.0% 69.4%* 56.4%  56.5% 
Number  of  observations  71 53  77 36  78 46 
         
C. Liquidation pref.:           
Less than invested funds 26.7%  44.4%** 37.0%  16.7%* 29.3%  42.6%**
Equal to invested funds 16.0%  20.4%** 17.3%  22.2%* 15.8%  21.3%**
More than invested funds  57.3%  35.2%** 45.7%  61.1%* 54.9%  36.2%**
Cumulative dividends  23.6%  15.7% 22.5%  11.4% 24.4%  18.5% 
Part. preferred (or equiv.)  39.7%  27.8% 32.5%  44.4% 21.7%  42.0%**
Other “booster” (e.g. 3x)  19.4% 9.3%  15.0% 17.0% 9.9%  24.4%**
Sample  size  75 54  81 36  82 47 
           
D. Exit provisions:           
VC has redemption rights  43.2%  21.0%*** 32.6%  38.6%  34.7% 34.0% 
Other senior exit 
mechanism 
51.6% 47.9%  47.9% 56.7% 55.1%  41.5% 
No senior exit mechanism  30.7%  45.6%* 38.2%  29.6%  32.6% 44.0% 
Sample  size  88 57  89 44  95 50 
           
E. Board control           
No. seats, total, mean (med)  6.0 (6.0)  5.2 (5.0) **  5.5 (5.0)  5.9 (6.0)  5.8 (6.0)  5.5 (5.0) 
% VC board seats  40.2 (40.0)  33.5 (33.3)**  35.6 (33.3)  41.2 (40.0)**  32.7 (35.4)  39.8 (40.0)*
Degree of board control: 
        
Founder controls board 14.8%  47.4%*** 32.6%  18.2%** 24.2%  34.0% 
Neither / state-contingent   70.4%  43.9%*** 59.6%  59.1%** 63.2%  54.0% 
VC controls board  14.8%  8.8%*** 7.9%  22.7%** 12.6%  12.0% 
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